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III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. Whether or not the district court abused its discretion 
in not requiring defendants to answer plaintiff's Interrogatories, 
Set Number 3, fully and with candor as required by Rule 33(a), 
URCP. 
B. Whether or not the court abused its discretion in failing 
to strike the affidavit of Dr. Swinyer, defendants' expert, who 
expressed an opinion in support of defendants' motion for summary 
judgment. 
C. Whether or not the court abused its discretion in ruling 
as a matter of law that there was no genuine issue of causation and 
that the defendants were therefore entitled to summary judgment in 
their favor. 
IV. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES. 
See plaintiff's/appellant's principal brief. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: As stated in plaintiff's/appellant's 
principal brief. 
VI. RELEVANT FACTS 
The following facts are stated to clarify and address 
defendants' statement of facts. The numbering system of the 
principal brief is continued. 
S. Plaintiff used the iron until September, 1990, believing 
all the time that any chemicals which might have been in the iron 
at the time of the incident of which she complained had been 
eliminated by the "Before Use Cleaning" and by her initial use of 
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the iron.(Plaint iff's Deposition, Page 47, Lines 10-25), R. 0210. 
Defendants did not tell plaintiff that those "chemical residues" 
were really chemicals which had been designed into the iron, nor 
did they advise plaintiff not to use the iron. 
T. Dr. Sotiriou stated that plaintiff/appe1lant "has a bad 
case of contact dermatitis, I mean she is severe." Dr. Sotiriou's 
Deposition, Page 57, Line 22. 
U. Neither Dr. Sotiriou nor Dr. Zone expected plaintiff to 
undergo patch testing unless and until her skin was clear and she 
was not using corticosteroids two prerequisites for satisfactory 
patch testing. Deposition of Dr. Zone, Page 27, Lines 14-20. At no 
time during the relevant period to which defendants refer did 
plaintiff meet the prerequisite conditions for patch testing. When 
her skin was clear she was taking corticosteroids. 
V. Dr. Lieferman diagnosed possible "T-cell lymphoma", a type 
of cancer. Since Dr. Lieferman's diagnosis and her planned 
treatment were so speculative, and since biopsies were negative(Dr. 
Zone's Deposition, Exhibit 8, pg 6, lines 4-15, plaintiff's 
principal brief) and Dr. Zone's examination of plaintiff did not 
confirm T-cel1 lymphoma,(pg 7, lines 4-25), plaintiff was justified 
in declining to follow the doctor's advice.(Dr. Lieferman's letter 
from Mayo Clinic to Dr. Sotiriou, Exhibit 5, of Dr. Zone's 
deposition.) That plaintiff's skin condition cleared up since she 
quit using defendants' iron indicates the incorrectness of Dr. 
Leiferman's diagnosis and demonstrates that plaintiff's decision 
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was correct. 
W. Dr. Zone was specifically asked, at Page 24, Line 22, of 
his deposition whether plaintiff's problems in 1989 were 
"essentially the same" as those Dr. Reese described in 1983. Dr. 
Zone's answer was, "It is impossivble for me to say, because I did 
not see her in 1983." See also: Stated Fact 16 at R. 0344 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiff is not trying to "divert the court's attention" 
by taking issue with the trial court's discovery rulings and the 
adequacy of Dr. Swinyer's affidavit. Plaintiff is directing the 
court's attention to a series of serious errors, amounting to abuse 
of judicial discretion, which have been made in the progress of 
this case and which deserve redress. Such errors are at the 
foundation of everything that has occurred so far in prosecuting 
this action, and they go to the very question expressed by 
defendants(Page 9 of their brief), "whether the trial court 
properly entered summary judgment" based on the record of the case 
which is not devoid of evidence supporting plaintiff's allegations 
of causation and on an affidavit issued by an expert, incompetent 
to testify with respect to causation, furnished by the defendants. 
Plaintiff is asking the court to decide whether a family 
of corporate defendants, doing business on an international scale 
and engaged in state of the art manufacturing, in foreign 
countries, of appliances and tools which they expect to sell, and 
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do sell, in Utah and the rest of the United States, should be able 
to control the outcome of a products liability case against them by 
simply refusing to disclose information over which they have sole 
and exclusive control when the information was requested in an 
injured plaintiff's interrogatories, to which interrogatories 
defendants' did not timely object. 
B. Further, the plaintiff is not denying that Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 56(e) calls for rebutting affidavits of the 
non-moving party in response to a proper Summary Judgment motion, 
but she questions whether defendants' Summary Judgment motion was 
properly founded and claims consideration in view of the facts of 
this case and by virtue of Rule 56(f). Plaintiff claims that the 
fact that defendants/appellees' are the exclusive possessors and 
controllers of evidence essential to the issue of causation in this 
discovery phase of the prosecution of this case against them, gives 
them virtually exclusive control of the case's progress. By simply 
withholding the identities of the chemical products defendants 
selected as they designed the culprit "The Classic" metal iron and 
as they used them in the iron's manufacture, defendants have 
thwarted any efforts at a scientific and technical evaluation of 
plaintiff's allegations of causation by both the experts of the 
plaintiff and of the defendants. The resolution of this case should 
not be so controlled. 
C. Plaintiff does not argue "that she bore no burden to 
present evidence in response to Black and Decker's motion". She is 
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saying that if she could not meet that burden, it was because 
defendants are in sole and exclusive control of the very 
information she must have to develop her proofs. This is not a case 
in which the ultimate fact at issue is simply not capable of proof. 
The facts in the record bear this out, and her affidavit filed with 
her brief in opposition to summary judgment support her claim. When 
the court gives defendants the power to control the evidence, it 
gives defendants the power to move for summary judgment at their 
convenience. If the safeguards of the standards by which 
interrogatories and affidavits are judged are ignored, the trial 
court's summary judgment against the plaint iff/appe1lant does not 
in fact resolve this case on the merits. 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
A. JUDGE MOFFAT ABUSED HIS JUDICIAL DISCRETION WHEN HE FAILED 
TO REQUIRE BLACK AND DECKER TO ANSWER PLAINTIFF'S 
INTERROGATORIES, SET NUMBER 3, FULLY AND WITH CANDOR, 
1. Plaintiff does not "question the trial court's 
authority", as suggested by defendants(Brief Pg. 18), to "manage" 
discovery before, or after, the defendants failed to object to 
plaintiff's Interrogatories, Set Number 3. Defendants cite Utah 
Road Commission v. Petty, 412 P.2d 914 as their authority. 
Plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 
failing to issue a ruling which directly settled the question of 
whether or not the defendants were going to be required to produce 
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full and complete answers to plaintiff's Interrogatories, Set 
Number 3, (Petty, at 917, rt. col. lines 7-15), particularly when 
defendants failed to object thereto and gave no reason for not 
answering "f ul ly" (Rule 33, URCP) , (Petty, at pg. 916, rt. col, last 
full sentence) did not claim privilege, (Petty at pg. 916, bottom 
of rt. col., beginning with word "However" and continuing six lines 
on page 917). 
a. Trial Court's First Opportunity to Rule. 
Opportunity for the court to rule on whether or 
not defendants/appellees should be required to answer plaintiff's 
Interrogatories, Set Number 3, fully and completely as required by 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 33(a), was given with 
plaintiff's Motion for More Complete Answers, R. 0225 and 
supporting memo at R. 0209, in which plaintiff pointed out, in 
detail, that defendants' answers "were incomplete, unclear and 
evasive'1, R. 0210, 18th line thru R. 0215, but the court's order 
failed to rule on the issue directly. In fact the court granted 
plaintiff's motion for more complete answers and thereby recognized 
the requirement of the rule, R. 273, and at the same time made it 
impossible for plaintiff to appeal the ruling. The court's order of 
20 November 1991, R. 0283, however, disregarded all of the 
arguments of plaintiff and failed to grant that which plaintiff was 
seeking, "full and complete answers to her interrogatories". 
Plaintiff objected to the proposed order prepared by defendants, R. 
0274, because its wording gave defendants license to give answers 
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which were not much more complete than their original answers, but 
that is the order Judge Moffatt signed. The court gave no specific 
reasons for such a ruling. 
Had the court ruled directly against plaintiff 
at that time, plaintiff could have appealed the ruling, the issue 
could have been resolved two years ago, and there would have been 
no further need for discussion of the problem, or sanctions. 
Defendants' brief, at pg. 21, mid page. 
b. Trial Court's Second Opportunity to Rule: 
A second opportunity for the trial court to 
directly rule on the issue was afforded when plaintiff challenged 
defendants' compliance with the court's order of 20 November 1993, 
with an objection, R. 0292 and R. 0294, and a motion for formal 
compliance with the court's order. R. 0292. Plaint iff/appe1lant 
therein recited her objections in specific detail, R. 0295-303, and 
suggested a method of satisfying the objections, R. 0304. The 
court, although grudgingly, granted plaintiff's motion, R. 0354, 
and issued its order, R. 0467, making an appeal by plaintiff 
impossible. But, even with a knowledge of the admission of 
defendants' counsel that defendants had not answered plaintiff's 
interrogatories, Set Number 3, "fully and completely" (Counsel's 
Letter to Judge Moffatt, dated 21 November 1991, R. 0286, at 0287 
lower half of page.) The trial court did not require that which 
plaintiff was seeking, "full and complete answers" to her 
Interrogatories, Set Number 3. Again, had the court ruled directly 
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against plaintiff/appe1lant on that occasion, she could have 
appealed, and the issue would have been settled sixteen months ago, 
c. Now, in this appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals is 
being called upon by the plaintiff/appe1lant to decide whether or 
not the trial court abused its discretion when it acted as it did 
and whether the defendants should have been required to furnish 
"full and complete" answers to plaintiff's Interrogatories, Set 
Number 3, in the absence of valid objections to the 
interrogatories. Had defendants stated their objections with their 
timely answers, those objections could have been resolved 
immediately and directly by the trial court with considerable 
economy of effort by all concerned. Petty, 412 P.2d at 917, rt. 
col., 1ines 3-7. 
2. Regarding defendants' suggestion that plaintiff's 
interrogatories and her efforts to obtain complete answers are 
"tricks to surprise the defendants'1. 
a. Defendants/appellees suggest, by their selected 
quotation from State Road Commission v. Petty, 412 P,2d 914, that 
plaintiff is employing "tricks to surprise the opposition at a 
critical moment", (Defendants' brief at page 18) Surely filing 
interrogatories, early in the commencement of this action, does 
not fall into that category. Besides, Set Number 3 could not 
surprise defendants, because they have known of plaintiff's need 
for the information Set Number 3 seeks, and virtually all other 
aspects of this case since 4 May 1988, some 19 months before this 
lawsuit was filed. R. 0239; see also R. 0316. Defendants further 
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suggest, by the quoted passage, that plaintiff has been sitting 
idly by while defendants have prepared their case with zeal and 
diligence and that with four simply stated interrogatories of Set 
Number 3, plaintiff is asking for information, the acquisition of 
which involved defendants in a great deal of time, effort and 
expense in the preparation of their own defense case. Appellees 
surely jest. 
The court in Pet ty, as quoted in 
defendants'/appe1 lees' brief at pg 18, was giving an example of a 
situation in which one party attempts to obtain privileged 
information collected by the other party in the course of the other 
party's own discovery. The issue in Petty arises from the 
plaintiff's appeal of an order requiring plaintiff to answer 
certain interrogatories. Petty states some appropriate general 
principles for interpreting and applying the requirements of Rule 
33, URCP. The passage appellees quoted, however, has no application 
to the present case. The information sought by plaintiffs in her 
interrogatories was generated by defendants/appellees in the normal 
course of the defendants' business of designing, manufacturing and 
distributing defendants' iron, not in the preparation of their 
defense in this case. That plaintiff asked defendants to identify, 
with names recognized by scientists, technicians and/or the 
suppliers trading with Black and Decker, the chemicals or chemical 
products defendants have selected, and which they procure, to be 
manufactured into their iron at only twelve locations, R. 0221-
9 
0223, is not carrying discovery to the extreme so as to be unduly 
burdensome to defendants. 
3. With respect to defendants'/appellees' knowledge or 
lack thereof of the components of their "The Classic" metal steam 
iron. 
a. Defendants, in their sophistry, say that they 
were Mnot aware of the chemical composition of all of the 
components supplied by third party manufacturers used in the 
assembly of the iron." Note that plaintiff has never asked for 
"the chemical compositions of all of the components supplied by 
third party manufacturers used in the assembly of the iron." The 
interrogatories do not ask for such information, neither has the 
plaintiff asked for such information since she issued her 
interrogatories. She has asked only that defendants, using the 
language of science and/or of the technicians who procure and use 
the chemical products in the manufacture of the iron, identify the 
chemicals and/or the products used in the iron at only twelve sites 
within the iron. Even if defendants "were not aware of the chemical 
composition of all of the components supplied by third party 
manufacturers used in the assembly of the iron" they would have 
known much more about those components than they profess, but in 
any event they have admitted that they know more than they have 
furnished. Counsel's letter. R. 0286, bottom half of page, and they 
have not revealed that which they do know. 
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b. Defendants acknowledged that they knew(know) what 
plaintiff's interrogatories asked when in their Memorandum in Reply 
to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Protective Order they said, ". . ., what plaintiff really wants is 
simply an identification of the chemicals used in the manufacture 
of the iron." R. 0135, and as quoted at R. 0238, last paragraph. 
How Refreshing! 
c. Plaintiff has not asked defendants to "search out 
new information" she has asked only that "information which it 
already has" be furnished. Plaintiff has demonstrated time and 
again that defendants have not complied with the spirit and intent 
of rules 26 and 33, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. For one example, 
see R. 0299-0303. 
4. Regarding the respective situations and resources and 
the lack of availability to the plaintiff of the information sought 
by any other means. State Road Commission v. Petty, 412 P.2d 916, 
at 918, Middle of Left Column. 
It would be a financial and physical impossibility for 
the plaint iff/appellant to determine the components of the chemical 
products designed into the defendants' iron with the degree of 
accuracy required by the facts of this case. To relieve the 
defendants from the responsibility of fully answering plaintiff's 
interrogatories is tantamount to requiring plaintiff to reinvent 
exactly all of the sealants, coatings, insulations, and other 
chemical products used in the iron, and she would have no assurance 
that the end products would be identical to the ones actually used 
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in the culprit iron. On the other hand defendants, in designing 
the iron, had certain problems to solve, and they solved those 
problems by ultimately selecting the products they have used at the 
twelve sites within the iron identified by plaintiff. In solving 
those problems they also had to decide whether to "make or buy" 
each component product. If they decided to make the product, then 
they would have had to specify its components in terms of 
scientific or trade names and procure the same. If they decided to 
buy the product, then they had to purchase by specification and/or 
they had to purchase by scientific, technical or trade name. If 
they purchased from vendors they know, or should know, the names of 
those vendors and the names of the products purchased there from. 
5. Plaint iff'appellant never asked defendants/appellees 
to "perform the plaintiff's testing" as alleged by defendants in 
their brief at page 18. 
The fact of the matter is that whether or not the 
defendants should "perform the plaintiff's testing" is not now and 
has never been an issue. What testing would they do? They are 
already fully versed in the manufacture of their iron. They know 
the identities of all of the suspect chemical products in the iron. 
A search of the record will reveal that the plaintiff has never 
asked the defendants to do testing of any kind. 
6. Plaintiff did not refuse to let defendants inspect 
and/or test the culprit iron. Defendants' Brief, Pg. 21. 
Contrary to defendants' assertion at page 21 of their 
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brief, plaintiff did not refuse to allow Black and Decker to 
inspect the iron in question. Black and Decker, at the plaintiff's 
home and through their insurance company, inspected the culprit 
iron , took notes of its identifying features and made photographs 
of the culprit iron on or about 13 June 1988. What took place on 
the occasion to which defendants refer was the suggestion by 
defendants that they wanted the iron so they could perform tests 
thereon. 
To understand the problem involved with any testing 
done on the iron, one must be aware that there is only one culprit 
"The Classic" metal steam iron with its assembly of suspect 
chemical products therein, and one must understand that such 
testing one can do on the iron relevant to the problem of causation 
is destructive of the evidence. Plaintiff, therefore, objected to 
any testing by either party, which was not planned and coordinated 
by the parties and the results shared by the parties,, R. 0161. 
There was much exchange over this matter and Judge Moffat issued a 
minute entry calling for plaintiff to turn over the iron, R. 0157, 
but when all of the facts were made known to him, and after a 
letter from counsel for defendants to Judge Moffat, R. 0174, and by 
stipulation of the parties, the judge refrained from ever signing 
an order requiring plaintiff to turn the culprit iron over to 
defendants. R. 0157; R. 0161; R. 0166; See also, R. 0338 at page 3, 
Par 4; and R. 396 at page 8, pars a,b & c and Ex. 6. 
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7. With respect to defendants'/appe1 lees ' independant 
medical examination of plaintiff. 
Defendants accuse plaintiff of refusing to undergo 
an independant medical examination, (defendants brief at Pg 21, mid 
page). Plaintiff did not refuse to take an independant medical 
examination. What actually took place was that plaintiff objected 
to taking the examination with anyone who had not been informed of 
the chemicals in the iron, R. 0270. Once the court ruled she was 
examined by Dr. Swinyer. 
8. With respect to sanctions against plaintiff's 
attorney, defendants' brief at page 21. 
See plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to 
Sanctions. R. 0338, at 339-345, and R. 345, last paragraph. 
The occasion for sanctions would never have arisen 
in the absence of the trial court's failure to issue an appealable 
ruling exempting defendants from answering plaintiff's 
interrogatories fully. 
B. THE SWINYER AFFIDAVIT DID NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 56(e), UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND THE FACTS AND DATA ON WHICH 
HE STATED HE BASED HIS OPINION DO NOT MEET THE TEST OF 
RULE 703, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
1. Dr. Swinyer clearly lacked the personal knowledge 
required by Rule 56(e), URCP. See Appellant's principle brief at 
pages 26-31. The standard by which affidavits are judged for the 
purpose of summary judgment: " • . , affidavits must include not 
only the expert's opinion, but also the specific facts that 
logically support the experts conclusion." "In so doing, we stress 
the requirement that rule 56(e) requires specific facts." "A bare 
assertion that the expert has reviewed the facts and based his or 
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her opinion on them will not suffice." Butterfield v. Okubo* 831 
P.2d 97(Utah 1992), at 104, middle of left col.) 
2. Defendants' counsel has correctly quoted Rule 703, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, but he has incorrectly applied it. 
The rule states, "The facts or data in the 
particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference 
may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the 
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the 
subject . • " 
No one, particularly the defendants, made known to 
defendants' experts, and particularly to Dr. Swinyer prior to his 
affidavit, the names of the chemicals in the iron, the very 
information necessarily "reasonably relied upon by experts", in the 
particular field of analyzing the migration of chemicals, in 
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject of causation in the 
context of the relevant facts alleged by plaintiff/appe1lant• 
3, All of the facts upon which Dr. Swinyer based his 
opinion are not admissible in evidence to disprove causation in 
this case. 
a. In the absence of a knowledge of the offending 
chemicals and the knowledge born of experiment, such facts as Dr. 
Swinyer revealed as the basis of his affidavit opinion are 
inadequate to disprove causation and would therefore be excluded, 
because their probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
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danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury . . . ", Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
b. In the absence of a knowledge of the offending 
chemicals, the facts on which Dr. Swinyer based his opinions 
expressed in his affidavit would be irrelevant to disprove 
causation. Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFF COULD NOT MEET HER BURDEN 
OF PROVING CAUSATION. 
1. Plaintiff/appe1lant argues that defendants failed to 
meet their initial twin burden of showing that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and of showing that they are entitled 
to a summary judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. But, if they have met that initial burden: 
a. Rule 56(f) provides protection if a party who 
has good grounds for opposing a motion for summary judgment is 
unable at the time of the hearing to present acceptable evidence 
that there is a genuine issue of fact. The rule states that: 
"Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that he cannot, for reasons stated, 
present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
judgment, or order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had, 
or make such other order as is just." 
Under proper circumstances, if the opposing party has no 
means to meet successfully the facts alleged in the moving party's 
affidavits, summary judgment will be denied. U.S. v. Gotham 
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Pharmacal Corporation, D.C.N.Y. 1941, 1 F.R.D. 744. 
b. A plaintiff opposing a motion for summary 
judgment is not required to file opposing affidavits but may stand 
upon his pleadings provided that his allegations, if proved, would 
establish a basis for recovery. Christensen ex.rel. Christensen v. 
Financial Serv. Co., 14 Utah 2d 101, 675 P.2d 1170(Utah 1963. The 
fact that party opposed to the motion for summary judgment fails to 
submit documents in opposition does not preclude the denial of the 
motion; where the party opposed submits no documents in opposition, 
the moving party may be granted summary judgment only if 
appropriate, that is, he is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Olwell v. Clark 658 P.2d 585(Utah 1982) Summary judgment 
need not be affirmed merely because party opposing summary judgment 
did not file affidavits in order to avoid judgment against 
him.Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright and Miles, 
Chartered, 681 P2d 1258(Utah 1984) 
2, Defendants cite Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2nd 265(1986) for the proposition 
that "a plaintiff must respond to a motion for summary judgment if 
the defendant has brought to the court's attention, by way of 
affidavit or simply by reference to the record, that there is no 
evidence concerning an element of the plaintiff's case upon which 
the plaintiff bears the burden at trial.,f Defendants Brief, Pg. 15, 
last 4 lines, and then conclude "that if plaintiff fails to present 
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evidence, summary judgment is appropriate/' Pg. 16, first line. 
Defendants ultimately apply their understanding to the present case 
by stating that, "Black and Decker shifted the burden to Mrs. Davis 
merely by informing the court that none of Mrs. Davis' treating 
physicians supported her theory." Defendants1 Brief, Pg. 21, last 
ful1 sentence. 
Defendant's initial burden is two fold. Defendants 
claim they met the burden by informing the trial court that 
treating physicians do not support her theory (defendants' brief at 
page 21, 3rd line from bottom). Such revelation, aside from not 
being an accurate statement of the fact stated, did not meet the 
movants' burden. Any simple reference to the record must be more 
than an unsupported statement that the record shows no evidence 
concerning a key element of plaintiff's burden. Such reference must 
"show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Celotex, pg 2552, quoting rule 56(c). Having failed to meet moving 
party's burden in both respects defendants were not entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law, irrespective of non-moving 
party's response. 
The Supreme Court, in Celotex, conditioned its 
ruling with the words^ 
"after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, 
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to that 
party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden 
of proof at trial." Celotex, Pg. 2552, Rt Col, Line 12. 
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The record in the instant case is not devoid of 
evidence supporting plaintiff's allegations of causation, including 
probable cause. 
Plaintiff/appe1lant argues that because of judicial 
abuse of discretion and defendants' failure to respond fully in 
their answers to plaintiff's Interrogatories, Set Number 3, she has 
not had "adequate time for discovery" and that in any event she has 
made a showing sufficient to demonstrate that defendeints are not 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
The Supreme Court, in Celotex, was envisioning a 
situation where there was a "complete failure of proof" as in 
Celotex where the plaintiff had failed to establish that defendant 
was indeed the manufacturer of the asbestos which caused 
plaintiff's injuries. The facts in Celotex seem to indicate that 
the essential fact, "to whose asbestos was the plaintiff in Celotex 
exposed?" was indeterminable, so the essential fact of Celotex's 
manufacture of the injuring asbestos could not under any 
circumstance be proved. Such is not the situation in Davis v. Black 
and Decker in which the issue of causation is not so clear cut, and 
the manufacturer of the iron is known. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Celotex also said, 
"We do not mean that the nonmoving party must produce 
evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in 
order to avoid summary judgment. Obviously, Rule 56 does 
not require a nonmoving party to depose her own witnesses. 
Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be 
opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed 
in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves, and it 
is from this list that one would normally expect the 
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nonmoving party to make the showing to which we have 
referred. " Celotex, Pg 2553, item 7. 
3. Plaint i ff/appe 1 lant in the instant case is not a party 
who has completely failed "to establish the existence of an element 
essential to that party's case". The record is not devoid of 
evidence supporting her allegations of causation including probable 
cause. For example the record of this case reveals the following 
facts which serve to establish causation. 
a. Plaint iff/appe1lant has identified the culprit 
iron to be "The Classic" metal steam iron in her Amended Complaint, 
R. 0019, Par 2 , and by Affidavit. R. 0547, Par 2. Defendants 
agree. 
b. She has identified the manufacturer and the Utah 
distributor of "The Classic" in Utah as the defendants. (Amended 
Complaint, R. 020, Par 8.) Plaintiff can support her allegations 
with the actual iron she claims injured her. It identifies the 
defendants as the manufacturers, and defendants have not denied 
that they manufacture and distribute "The Classic" metal steam iron 
and have proceeded in this case as though they were the 
manufacturers and distributors of the iron. 
c. She has alleged and can verify by the testimony 
of Dr. Darrell G. Hensleigh, M.D., specialist in internal medicine 
and oncology, who gave her a routine general physical examination, 
on or about 22 May 1987, 7 months prior to the incident with the 
culprit "The Classic" metal iron, and by the medical records he 
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maintains, that her skin was free and clear of any dermatitis on 
that occasion. Defendants have the medical records of 
plaintiff/appe1lant maintained by Dr. Hensleigh, but do not mention 
him in their arguments. 
d. She has stated that she had been wearing the four 
two year old blouses which were the first blouses she ironed with 
her new "The Classic" steam iron without any skin problem prior to 
the incident of which she complains. Amended Complaint, R. 0021, 
Par 12; R. 0434-440, R. 0316 at 0317 4th par and 0318 1st par; 
Deposition of 01 Eve Loomis Davis, R. 
e. She has presented evidence, by way of affidavit, 
that identifies some twelve sites within the culprit "The Classic" 
metal steam iron at which products, essentially chemical in nature, 
have been designed and used in the iron as integral parts of the 
iron. Affidavit of Elmer T. Davis, Jr., R. 0221. This affidavit was 
based on personal knowledge gained from dissassembling a "The 
Classic" metal steam iron that was similar to the culprit iron, and 
the affidavit was submitted as an exhibit for the convenience of 
the court to establish the existence of chemicals not identified by 
defendants in their answers to plaintiff's interrogatories. Actual 
proof to the jury of chemicals in the iron would come, in part, 
from a dismantled "The Classic" metal steam iron in which each 
juror could see the chemicals for him(her)se 1 f. Defendants have 
admitted that chemicals have been incorporated into their iron by 
their answers to plaintiff's Interrogatories, Set Number 3, (R. 
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0683). and through defendants' counsel's letter to Judge Moffatt, 
(R. 0287, last two paragraphs on page). Defendants have admitted 
that there ar e some chemicals whose identities they have not 
revealed to plaintiff. 
f. Plaintiff/appellant has stated at R. 0317, 4th 
par, and at R. 0318, 2nd par, and alleged in her amended complaint, 
R. 0021, Par 12, and testified under oath that her injury occurred 
at the time of her first use of defendants' iron when she ironed 
four old blouses which she wore four consecutive days. Her skin 
began to react soon after she put on the first blouse immediate 1}' 
after she had ironed all four blouses. Affidavit. R. 0547, at 
Par 2. 
g. She has described her substantial injuries. R. 
0021, Par's. 12,13; R. 313-315. 
h. She has alleged in her Amended Complaint, R. 021, 
Par 12, that the defective condition of defendants' iron was the 
"proximate cause" of plaintiff's injuries for the purpose of 
product liability. R. 0022, Par 13. She has similarly alleged 
"proximate cause" with respect to "negligent design", R. 0025, Par 
20; "failure to warn", R. 0027, Par 28; "breach of warranty", 
R. 0029, Par 36; and "negligence", R. 0031, Par 43. Finally, she 
has, in support of her allegation of proximate cause, described in 
detail a mechanism by which chemicals from defendants' iron 
migrated from the iron to plaintiff's clothing and then to her 
skin. The mechanism she describes is amenable to scientific and 
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technical proof once the identities of the chemicals in the iron 
are made available. 
i. After the incident, she visited and was seen by 
Dr. Zone, Dr. Sotiriou, and Dr. Lieferman, all of whom confirmed 
that her skin was indeed broken out and diagnosed her condition to 
be contact dermatitis, a condition caused by substances coming in 
contact with the skin. Deposition of Dr. Zone, Plaintiff's Brief, 
Exhibit 8, Pg. 4, Ln. 10-12., Pg. 6, Lns. 1 & 2; Deposition of Dr. 
Sotiriou, Exhibit 7, Page 6. Ln. 7 - 12, Page 57, Ln 22. 
j. She testified that when she discovered that there 
had been chemicals designed into the iron, she discontinued its 
use, that her skin stopped reacting and that her skin began to 
heal. R. 547, Par, 3, That her skin had cleared up was confirmed in 
defendants' Dr. Swinyers report of his examination of the 
plaintiff. Affidavit of Dr. Swinyer. R. 0373, Par. 6. 
k. The fact that plainiff's skin has cleared up 
after discontinuing use of the iron puts to rest any suggestion 
that plaintiff's condition is atopic eczema or T-cell lymphoma, and 
it strongly suggests a relationship between the iron and her 
injuries . 
4. Additionally, proximate cause is a factual issue that 
generally cannot be resolved as a matter of law. Butterfield v. 
Okubo, 831 P.2d at 106, rt, col., first full par. 
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5. Finally, The court in Butterfield, at 106, last four 
lines rt. col,, had this to say, 
" • • . , it is the provence of the jury to 
resolve these factual disputes and to determine 
whether the causation theory is fatally attenuated. 
In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of the 
fact that doubts about whether a nonmovant has 
established a genuine issue of material fact should 
be resolved in favor of permitting the party to go 
to trial.'' 
6. With consideration of the foregoing it is abundantly 
clear that the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that 
plaintiff could not prove causation, which of necessity includes 
probable cause, and erred in its conclusion that a summary judgment 
was warranted in the instant case. 
IX. CONCLUSION: 
1. Plaint iff/appellant has demonstrated that the trial 
court, in its failure to make definite rulings on the adequacy of 
defendants' answers to plaintiff's Interrogatories, Set Number 3, 
in response to plaintiff's motions to compel deprived plaintiffs of 
the opportunity to have the issues determined early in the course 
of discovery in this case, has abused its judicial discretion and 
thereby has deprived plaintiff of foundational facts known by, and 
in the exclusive possession of, the defendants. 
2. She has shown that the affidavit of Dr. Swinyer should 
have been stricken, because of Dr. Swinyer's lack of personal 
knowledge of the very facts required to form an opinion with 
respect to causation in this case. The trial court abused its 
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judicial discretion when it failed to strike Dr. Swinyer's 
affidavit in support of defendants' summary judgment motion. 
3. Finally she has demonstrated that there is a genuine 
issue of causation still existing in this case which should 
ultimately go to a jury, and it was abuse of judicial discretion to 
grant a Summary Judgment as a matter of law against plaintiffs. 
4. WHEREFORE, The Court of Appeals should rule that the 
trial court abused its judicial discretion with respect to its 
discovery rulings and that the trial court erred when it granted 
Summary Judgment as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals should 
reverse the Summary Judgment and return the case to the trial court 
with instructions suggesting that the trial court require 
defendants to answer plaintiff's interrogatories fully by revealing 
the scientific and/or technical names, and the respective 
specifications or the names and addresses of the 
manufacturers/suppliers, of the chemical products found in the iron 
at the twelve sites identified by plaintiff. The chemical products 
named in their answers should be keyed to those twelve sites. 
X. RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL: 
Plaint iff/appellant respectfully requests the Court of 
Appeals to reverse the Summary Judgment of the trial court, return 
the case to the trial court for further discovery in accordance 
with suggestions made herein as is appropriate. 
Submitted this the 15th day of November'<1993. 
4f^mer Thomas Davis, Jr. / 
torney for Plaint iff/App#llant 
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